Ecuador’s National Assembly approved reforms this week that would legalise carbon markets, sending the legislation to President Daniel Noboa, who vetoed a similar bill in 2024. It is the second time this year lawmakers have passed the framework: an earlier reading cleared the Assembly in February with a 117-20 vote. The same week, on the other side of the world, Zambia switched on a national carbon registry for Article 6 projects. Two very different countries made the same underlying move: building the legal and technical plumbing that turns carbon assets into tradable units. For buyers and developers scanning for the next wave of supply jurisdictions, the pattern matters more than either headline alone.
What Ecuador’s Assembly Actually Approved
The reforms end a de facto exclusion that dates back to 2008, when Ecuador’s constitution, written under former President Rafael Correa, embedded a rights-of-nature doctrine that was widely read as incompatible with market-based environmental instruments. While Colombia, Peru and Chile built carbon trading ecosystems over the following decade and a half, Ecuador sat out the market despite holding some of the region’s largest forest carbon reserves.
The framework reported from the February vote covers both voluntary and compliance market activity. It provides for a national carbon credit registry, an Ecuadorian Carbon Exchange (BECX), and credit categories spanning REDD+, renewable energy, afforestation and blue carbon. UK-based ratings agency BeZero Carbon has been named the official ratings provider for the exchange, a signal that Quito wants the market rated against international benchmarks from day one rather than retrofitted later.
The resource base behind the legislation is substantial. Roughly 47% of Ecuador’s territory lies in the Amazon basin, and the country adds the Galapagos marine reserve and extensive coastal mangroves to its blue carbon potential. The World Bank has estimated Ecuador’s annual climate financing needs at $3.7 billion through 2050, against current public climate spending of around $500 million, a gap that carbon market proponents put at the centre of their case.
Why the Signature Is Not a Formality
The 2024 precedent is the reason this story is not over. Noboa vetoed similar legislation that year, and the political economy around carbon credits in Ecuador is contested: indigenous organisations have historically been sceptical of forest carbon schemes, and free, prior and informed consent requirements will shape how any Amazon REDD+ projects proceed under the new law.
The February-to-August sequence suggests the Assembly has now twice delivered a large majority for the reforms. That reduces the president’s room for an outright veto, but a partial veto or a slow walk on implementing regulations remains entirely possible. Until the signature lands and secondary rules are published, Ecuador has an approved framework on paper, not an operating market.
Zambia’s Registry Is the Other Half of the Pattern
On Friday, Zambia’s government launched an operational national carbon registry covering projects under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, with voluntary carbon market projects to follow. It is a quieter announcement than Ecuador’s vote, but arguably further along the implementation curve: a registry is the piece of infrastructure that makes corresponding adjustments, authorization and tracking technically possible.
Zambia has been assembling this stack for some time. It already has an Article 6 initiative with Norway that includes a tender for large-scale solar projects, and it sits among the supplier governments in the Coalition to Grow Carbon Markets. A live registry converts that positioning from diplomacy into capacity: developers can now point to a functioning national system for recording Article 6 units.
What This Means for Buyers and Developers
For buyers, Ecuador is the more interesting long-term supply story and the less certain one. If the framework is signed and the BECX launches with BeZero ratings attached, Ecuadorian credits would arrive with a transparency wrapper that most emerging supply jurisdictions lack. But the discount for political risk should stay in place until the signature, and anyone pricing future Ecuadorian REDD+ supply should assume consent processes with indigenous communities will set the real timeline.
For developers, Zambia is the actionable jurisdiction now. An operational Article 6 registry, an existing bilateral track with Norway and a government openly courting carbon finance is a combination that shortens the path from project design to authorized units. Ecuador, once signed, would offer scale but a longer regulatory runway.
For investors, the week’s common denominator is institutional build-out in the Global South ahead of demand. Countries are constructing registries, exchanges and legal frameworks on the expectation that Article 6 and high-integrity voluntary demand will arrive. That is a bet on policy momentum continuing through COP31 and beyond, and it is being made with real legislative capital.
What to Watch
Three checkpoints will separate signal from ceremony. First, Noboa’s decision on the Ecuadorian reforms, and whether any partial veto reshapes the registry or exchange provisions. Second, the publication of Ecuador’s implementing regulations, which will determine how consent, benefit sharing and credit authorization actually work. Third, the first Article 6 projects recorded in Zambia’s registry, which will show whether operational infrastructure translates into pipeline.
Ecuador has tried to legislate carbon markets before and failed at the presidential desk. This time the Assembly has delivered the bill twice in six months. The next move belongs to one man, and the market is watching it.
