The European Union’s carbon border levy now has a formal, bloc-level opponent. Environment and climate ministers from the 11 BRICS countries, meeting in New Delhi on 18 August, issued a joint statement opposing “unilateral, punitive, discriminatory and protectionist measures that are not in line with international law, such as carbon border adjustment mechanisms.” It is the first coordinated BRICS rebuke since CBAM entered its definitive regime on 1 January 2026, and it lands just as the mechanism shifts from paperwork to real money for importers and their suppliers.

What the New Delhi Statement Actually Says

The language sits in the adaptation and climate resilience section of the statement issued at the close of the 12th BRICS Environment Ministers’ Meeting, chaired by India. The bloc, which brings together Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Ethiopia, expressed concern that measures like CBAM “undermine efforts by countries, specifically the developing countries,” to build adaptive capacity and resilience.

The declaration leans on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), and pairs the CBAM passage with a demand that wealthy nations deliver on the New Collective Quantified Goal agreed at COP30 in Belem, including tripling adaptation finance to developing countries by 2035. India closed the meeting by handing hosting duties for the 13th edition to China, which will lead the bloc’s environment track in 2027.

None of this is new rhetoric in isolation. India made similar arguments at COP30 on behalf of the BASIC group and the Like-Minded Developing Countries, warning that “unilateral climate-related trade measures risk becoming instruments of protectionism.” What is new is the format: a formal joint statement, by an 11-country bloc, issued after CBAM certificates have become a live compliance instrument rather than a proposal.

Why the Timing Matters: 2027 Is When the Bill Arrives

CBAM has been in a transitional, reporting-only phase since 1 October 2023. Since 1 January 2026 it applies in full: importers of iron, steel, cement, fertilisers, aluminium and other covered goods must buy and surrender CBAM certificates linked to the emissions embedded in their products. The financial cycle closes in 2027, when the first carbon payments for 2026 imports come due.

That calendar explains the escalation. Exporting economies are moving from diplomatic objection to operational preparation at the same time. India, among the largest suppliers of CBAM-covered goods to the EU, is stepping up exporter preparedness ahead of the 2027 payments even as its ministers attack the mechanism in joint communiques. Companies in BRICS countries therefore face a dual track: their governments contest the levy’s legality while their commercial teams must still measure, report and price embedded emissions for European customers.

Pressure Is Building Inside the EU Too

The BRICS statement lands while CBAM is also being contested from within the bloc, from opposite directions. In Ireland, the national farming association warned this week that the border carbon fee will inflict pain on farmers and food production, compounding the strain of a prolonged drought. Meanwhile Europe’s steel and metals industry is pushing Brussels to extend CBAM to downstream products and to cap industrial power prices, arguing the current design leaves the value chain exposed.

For a mechanism only months into its definitive phase, that combination matters. External opposition from BRICS, cost complaints from European agriculture, and expansion demands from European industry all pull on the same policy file ahead of scheduled reviews. The CBAM that applies in 2027 may not be identical to the CBAM of 2026.

What It Means for Buyers, Exporters and Investors

The practical reading is unspectacular but important: a joint ministerial statement does not change a single compliance obligation. CBAM is EU law. Importers still need certificates, verified embedded-emissions data and surrender plans, and no diplomatic declaration suspends that.

What the statement does change is the risk context around three decisions.

  • Trade policy risk is now a portfolio variable. A formal BRICS position raises the probability of WTO disputes, retaliatory measures or counter-levies. Companies with concentrated sourcing in BRICS economies should scenario-test procurement costs under escalation, not just under CBAM as currently written.
  • Embedded-emissions data is becoming a commercial asset. Whatever New Delhi declares, European buyers will keep demanding installation-level data from suppliers in India, China and other exporting economies. Exporters who can deliver verified data will hold market access; those who cannot will face default values that price them out of contracts.
  • Climate finance linkage will shape negotiations. By tying CBAM criticism to adaptation finance and the New Collective Quantified Goal, BRICS is framing border carbon as a bargaining chip rather than a standalone file. Expect the issue to resurface in the run-up to the first certificate surrender in 2027.

What to Watch

Three markers will show whether the New Delhi statement stays symbolic or turns into action: any move toward a coordinated WTO challenge; whether individual BRICS members introduce domestic countermeasures against EU imports; and how Brussels handles the parallel internal pressures on CBAM’s scope and compensation design during its upcoming reviews. With China set to chair the BRICS environment track in 2027, the bloc’s largest emitter and one of the EU’s most CBAM-exposed suppliers will control the agenda of the next ministerial round.